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  Non-Technical Summary 
 
Recent economic analysis estimates the effects of different ownership structures on standard 
measures of corporate financial performance, such as revenue and capital investment, in the 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Frydman et al., 1999; Djankov, 1999; 
Claessens and Djankov, 1999). Our study estimates the effects of different ownership structures on 
corporate environmental performance, as measured by air pollutant emissions, in the transition 
economy of the Czech Republic during the years 1993 to 1998. In addition, we examine the link 
from financial performance to environmental performance. 
 
Similar to previous studies on ownership, our analysis focuses on the effect of privatization, 
in other words, the comparison between state ownership and private ownership. Along these lines, 
we test the generally accepted hypothesis that private ownership generates better environmentally-
related corporate performance. This hypothesis is based on the expectation that private owners more 
effectively reduce costs. Emissions represent costs because they generally indicate an inefficient use 
of inputs, generate emission charges (at least in our country of study), prompt greater need for costly 
end-of-pipe treatment when production management generates more residuals upstream in the 
production process, and induce regulatory authorities to impose potentially costly penalties, such as 
fines and requirements to modify production processes.  As an alternative hypothesis, preferences for 
better environmental stewardship, independent of cost concerns, may differ by ownership structure.  
In this case, the state may express a greater concern for the environment by reducing emissions more 
strongly than private owners. 
 
In addition, we examine variation across different types of private ownership. In particular, 
we distinguish between concentrated ownership (e.g., strategic investor) and diffuse ownership (e.g., 
investment fund) using three measures: (1) basic investor categories, (2) threshold level for reporting 
ownership shares, and (3) concentration measure based on the single largest shareholder. One might 
anticipate that more concentrated ownership permits owners to manage better costs, including 
environmentally-related costs.  However, the expected effect of ownership concentration remains a 
theoretically unresolved issue. 
 
Other recent economic analysis explores the links between corporate financial and 
environmental performance in mature market economies, especially the United States (e.g., Konar 
and Cohen, 2002; Gottsman and Kessler, 1998). Our study explores the effect of financial 
performance on environmental performance in the transition economy of the Czech Republic. In 
particular, our study determines whether successful financial performance begets or undermines 
good environmental performance. Successful financial performance may allow the firm to generate 
internal financial resources, which can be used to fund improvements in the firm’s ability to reduce 
pollution. This generation of internal financial resources is probably more important in a transition 
economy such as the Czech Republic. As a matter of fact, internal financing is especially important 
for investment in the Czech Republic since Czech accounting standards and tax laws require firms to 
finance all investment with retained profits (Lizal and Svejnar, 2002a, b). 
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Using a panel of Czech firms in the years 1993 to 1998, our analysis generates the following 
conclusions.  First, successful financial performance improves future environmental performance. 
Second, greater state ownership actually improves environmental performance relative to all other 
investor types even though the state apparently retained ownership in more polluting industries.  
More specifically, after controlling for firm-specific fixed effects, increased state ownership 
significantly leads to better environmental performance.  However, this conclusion depends on the 
treatment of firm-specific effects.  If these effects are treated as random rather than fixed, the effect 
of state ownership on environmental performance is statistically insignificant. 
 
Beyond the effect of state ownership, estimation results in general indicate that no type of 
private ownership significantly affects environmental performance.  Individually and collectively, 
categories of private investors do not affect environmental performance differently than does the 
benchmark category of dispersed owners, who hold only a minor share of any single firm. 
 
Overall, the estimation results indicate that the type of owner does not affect environmental 
performance as long as the analysis controls for production levels, sector-specific effects, and 
financial performance. In particular, financial performance seems to serve as the link from better 
ownership structure to improved environmental performance. Put differently, ownership structure 
does not directly affect environmental performance; it only indirectly affects environmental 
performance by influencing financial performance. 
 
In contrast, concentrated ownership, as measured by the single largest shareholder, improves 
the environmental performance, consistent with the notion that concentrated power allows an owner 
to manage better costs, including environmentally-related costs. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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1. Introduction 
Recent economic analysis estimates the effects of different ownership structures on standard 
measures of corporate financial performance, such as revenue and capital investment, in the 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Frydman et al., 1999; Djankov, 1999; 
Claessens and Djankov, 1999). Our study estimates the effects of different ownership structures on 
corporate environmental performance, as measured by air pollutant emissions, in the transition 
economy of the Czech Republic during the years 1993 to 1998. In addition, we examine the link 
from financial performance to environmental performance.
1 
Similar to previous studies on ownership, our analysis focuses on the effect of privatization, 
in other words, the comparison between state ownership and private ownership. Along these lines, 
we test the generally accepted hypothesis that private ownership generates better environmentally-
related corporate performance. This hypothesis is based on the expectation that private owners more 
effectively reduce costs. Emissions represent costs because they generally indicate an inefficient use 
of inputs, generate emission charges (at least in our country of study), prompt greater need for costly 
end-of-pipe treatment when production management generates more residuals upstream in the 
production process, and induce regulatory authorities to impose potentially costly penalties, such as 
fines and requirements to modify production processes.
2  As an alternative hypothesis, preferences 
for better environmental stewardship, independent of cost concerns, may differ by ownership  
 
                                                 
1 Other recent economic studies of environmental issues in the Czech Republic focus on government 
regulatory decisions rather than firm performance (Earnhart, 2000a; Earnhart, 2000b; Earnhart, 1997). 
2 Of course, state-owned firms may feel less to pressure to control emissions if state regulators are 
reluctant to impose fees, charges, and penalties on state-owned firms. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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structure.  In this case, the state may express a greater concern for the environment by reducing 
emissions more strongly than private owners. 
In addition, we examine variation across different types of private ownership. In particular, 
we distinguish between concentrated ownership (e.g., strategic investor) and diffuse ownership (e.g., 
investment fund) using three measures: (1) basic investor categories, (2) threshold level for reporting 
ownership shares, and (3) concentration measure based on the single largest shareholder. One might 
anticipate that more concentrated ownership permits owners to manage better costs, including 
environmentally-related costs.  To support this view, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that 
ownership concentration results in better monitoring of managers.  Similarly,  Admati et al. (1994) 
argue that the “free-riding of minor shareholders” in the decision process of corporate governance 
may undermine firm performance.  On the other hand, concentrated ownership may harm firm 
performance.  For example, Agion and Tirole (1997) argue that highly uncertain business conditions 
may require managerial initiative and incentives to acquire information.  Concentrated ownership 
may thwart these efforts.  Similarly, Bolton and von Thadden (1998) claim that dispersed ownership 
might be optimal if shareholders are able to block unwanted but necessary restructuring.   
Concentration may also proxy for multi-objective maximization, which could include preferences for 
better environmental stewardship, on the part of owners or managers as opposed to the simple model 
of single-criterion profit maximization (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972; Hart and Moore, 1990).  
Therefore, the expected effect of ownership concentration remains an unresolved issue.  Given that 
both positive and negative effects may exist in reality, our empirical analysis may not effectively 
identify any dominant pattern. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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Other recent economic analysis explores the links between corporate financial and 
environmental performance in mature market economies, especially the United States (e.g., Konar 
and Cohen, 2002; Gottsman and Kessler, 1998). Our study explores the effect of financial 
performance on environmental performance in the transition economy of the Czech Republic. In 
particular, our study determines whether successful financial performance begets or undermines 
good environmental performance. Successful financial performance may allow the firm to generate 
internal financial resources, which can be used to fund improvements in the firm’s ability to reduce 
pollution. This generation of internal financial resources is probably more important in a transition 
economy such as the Czech Republic. As a matter of fact, internal financing is especially important 
for investment in the Czech Republic since Czech accounting standards and tax laws require firms to 
finance all investment with retained profits (Lízal and Svejnar, 2002a, b). 
This paper attempts to answer the questions and test the hypotheses posed above within the 
following format. The next section notes the key features of the related economic literature. Section 
3 describes the database on corporate financial performance, ownership structure, and air emissions. 
Section 4 estimates and interprets the effects of ownership and financial performance on corporate 
environmental performance. The final section summarizes. 
2. Related Economic Literature 
2.1. Effects of Ownership Structure on Corporate Performance 
 Recent economic analysis estimates the effects of different ownership structures on standard 
measures of corporate financial performance in the transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE). Frydman et al. (1999) compares the performance of privatized and state firms in the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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transitional economies of Central Europe by examining growth rates in key financial indicators.
3  In 
particular, they examine sales revenues, employment, labor productivity, and labor and material 
costs (relative to revenues). They show that privatization has different effects on financial 
performance depending on the types of owners who gain control. In particular, outsiders but not 
insiders generate significant performance effects.
4 
Djankov (1999) explores the relationship between ownership structure and enterprise 
restructuring in six Newly Independent States. He finds differences across the type of private 
ownership. Foreign ownership generates enterprise restructuring at high levels of ownership. 
Manager ownership leads to enterprise restructuring at low or high levels of ownership but not at 
intermediate levels. Outside local investors do not significantly affect enterprise restructuring. 
Claessens and Djankov (1999) explore the relationship between the composition of 
ownership and corporate financial performance in the Czech Republic. Examining the period 1992 
through 1997, they reveal that more concentrated ownership leads to higher firm profitability and 
greater labor productivity. 
Kocenda and Svejnar (2002) also analyze the effect of ownership on post-privatization 
corporate financial performance in the Czech Republic. They reject the notion that domestic or 
                                                 
3 Due to the limited time frame of our study, we chose not to examine the growth rates for 
environmental performance. 
4 Our database does not distinguish between outsiders and insiders. Fortunately, due to the Czech 
privatization methods, no significant insider ownership is expected.  Claessens and Djankov (1999) report that 
the Czech voucher scheme prevented insiders from acquiring large ownership stakes since few direct sales of 
assets took place before the voucher privatization. Indeed, the ownership database used for this study contains 
almost no records of employee ownership.  Kocenda and Svejnar (2002), who utilize a similar data source, 
report this same feature of the ownership data.  Also, the recording of managerial ownership is mostly limited 
to the design of the large scale privatization scheme when the managers were required by the privatization law 
to prepare at least one privatization project.  For detailed descriptions of the Czech (and Czechoslovak) 
privatization process and its outcomes, see Kotrba (1995) and Kotrba (1997). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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foreign private ownership leads to increased sales.  Instead, they find that private domestic and 
foreign majority owners, as well as significant minority owners, increase profitability relative to 
state-owned firms.  Firms with dispersed ownership generate even higher profits than firms with 
more concentrated ownership; this result supports theories that stress managerial autonomy and 
initiative.  When domestic banks or portfolio companies represent the single largest owner, firms are 
generally incapable of carrying out major restructuring. 
Megginson and Netter (2001) provide a comprehensive survey of other empirical studies on 
privatization. This survey demonstrates that several studies examine corporate financial 
performance. However, to the best of knowledge, no published studies examine the effects of 
ownership structure, privatization in particular, on corporate environmental performance. 
2.2. Links between Financial and Environmental Performance 
Other recent economic analysis explores the links between corporate financial and 
environmental performance. All of these studies analyze firms in mature market economies. The first 
set of studies explore only the link from environmental performance to financial performance. As 
one example, Konar and Cohen (2002) explore the link from environmental performance to financial 
performance as captured by a firm’s market value. After controlling for variables traditionally 
thought to explain corporate financial performance, they demonstrate that bad environmental 
performance is negatively correlated with market value. In particular, a 10 % reduction in toxic 
chemical emissions causes a $ 34 million increase in market value. 
Gottsman and Kessler (1998) also explore the link from environmental performance to 
financial performance. They compare the financial returns to the S&P 500 against three sub-samples 
based on four measures of environmental performance. In particular, they divide firms into the top William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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75%, top 50%, and top 25% of environmental performers across all industries.  They find no 
statistically significant differences in financial performance between the three categories of 
environmental performers. 
Bosch et al. (1998) explore the effect of federal environmental enforcement, which represents 
one measure of environmental performance, on stockholder wealth.  They show that the stock 
market reacts negatively upon learning that a given firm has been targeted for enforcement. 
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) examine the link between signals of strong environmental 
management, as measured by environmental performance awards, and firms’ equity returns; they 
also examine the link between signals of weak environmental management, as measured by 
environmental “crises”, and firms’ equity returns. They demonstrate that signals of strong 
management increase equity returns, while signals of weak management lower equity returns. 
Austin et al. (1999) also explore the link from environmental performance to financial 
performance. More important to our research, they explore the link from financial performance to 
environmental performance. In particular, they seek to identify the causal relationship between these 
two types of performance by employing sample means tests and regression analysis. In the context 
of sample means tests, they divide firms into “green” and “brown” categories to test the differences 
in financial performance mean values. Conversely, they divide firms into “black” and “red” 
categories, according to financial performance, to test the differences in environmental performance 
mean values. In the regression context, they regress financial performance on lagged environmental 
performance and regress environmental performance on lagged financial performance. Their results  
provide strong evidence of a relationship existing between environmental and financial performance 
but cannot strongly identify the direction in which causality runs. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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Our study draws upon both of these economic research strains to examine the effect of 
ownership structure on corporate environmental performance and to explore the link from financial 
performance to environmental performance in the transition economy of the Czech Republic. 
3. Data on Financial and Environmental Performance and Ownership Structure 
3.1. Czech Republic as Study Site 
To examine the effects of ownership structure and explore the link from financial to 
environmental performance, we exploit data on firms in the Czech Republic, which is an excellent 
site for our study. First, this transition economy possesses a highly interesting pattern of ownership 
structures due to the chosen privatization methods, especially the extensive use of citizen vouchers 
(Weiss and Nikitin, 2002). Second, most Czech enterprises have been privatized, yet some key 
sectors in our study remain heavily state-controlled. For example, all utilities, especially energy 
utilities, were state-controlled throughout the period examined.
5  Therefore, our study is able to 
examine the distinction between wholly state-owned firms and privatized firms for the entire sample 
period. Even when state-owned enterprises have been privatized, the state still maintains significant 
influence. Kocenda (1999) shows that the state is able to influence over 76% of the total assets using 
three means: (1) primary ownership, (2) veto power of “golden shares”, and (3) secondary ownership 
(i.e., the firm is owned by a state-controlled firm).
6 Since our study measures the share of state  
 
                                                 
5   A utility company is a typical example of a ‘strategic company” that the state controls with veto 
power based on “golden shares”, according to Kocenda (1999). 
6  As another indicator of the state’s influence across the Czech economy, the total book value of the 
shares (assets) held directly by the National Property Fund is still even larger than the book value of shares 
that were subject to the voucher privatization (Kocenda, 1999). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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ownership, we are able to capture this state influence over privatized firms as a means of examining 
the distinction between state and private ownership in more general terms. 
Third, several previous studies examine the effect of ownership on standard measures of 
corporate financial performance in the Czech Republic (e.g., Claessens and Djankov, 1999). Thus,  
we are able to compare our results on environmentally-related corporate performance to others’ 
results on standard performance measures. 
Fourth, the Czech Republic has a substantially degraded environment; in particular, poor 
ambient air quality and air pollution is a large environmental problem of public concern in the Czech 
Republic (World Bank, 1992). In response to public concern, the Czech government has taken strong 
and successful steps to reduce air emissions substantially during the period 1991 to 1998 (Czech 
Ministry of Environment, 1998). Figure 1 displays the trend of air emissions over this period.
7 While 
an overall decline in economic activity and reduced energy demand certainly explain part of this 
decline, pollution control laws (e.g., 1991 Czech National Air Act) and firms’ pollution control 
efforts, such as installation of electrostatic precipitators (“scrubbers”) and fuel switching, also 
explain much of this decline (World Bank, 1999).  Fifth, the Czech government is currently seeking 
to enter the European Union (EU) and must reduce industrial emissions to qualify for membership. 
These efforts dovetail with efforts to allay public concern over air quality.
8 
 
 
                                                 
7  Nitrous oxide (NOx) emissions do not demonstrate as strong a downward trend due to the rapid rise 
in automobile ownership and use. 
8  Further details on country-wide emissions, Czech air regulations, and environmental issues related 
to EU accession are available upon request. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
 
 
 
9
3.2. Panel Data from Financial Statements, Ownership Files, and Emissions Register 
To examine financial performance and ownership structure at Czech enterprises, we gather 
data from three segments of a database provided by the private data vendor Aspekt. One segment 
provides information drawn from firms’ balance sheets, such as asset levels, and information taken 
from firms’ income (profit/loss) statements, such as profits. The second (smaller) segment provides 
information on ownership structure. We gather balance sheet and income statement data for the years 
1993 to 1999 and ownership data for the years 1994 to 1999. The Aspekt database includes all firms 
traded on the Prague Stock Exchange, publicly traded firms [i.e., firms registered for trading on the 
RMS (Registra_ní místo system) secondary market], and a majority of the remaining large Czech 
firms (plus the key trading partners of these large firms). Since all firms that underwent voucher 
privatization were publicly traded at the beginning of the privatization process, these firms represent 
the majority of the firms included in the Aspekt database. 
As an indicator of corporate environmental performance, we chose air pollutants emitted by 
Czech entities for the years 1982 and 1998. The included pollutants are carbon monoxide (CO), 
sulfur dioxide (SO2), particulate matter, and nitrous oxides (NOx), which represent the main and 
most heavily regulated pollutants in the Czech Republic, similar to other industrialized nations. The 
Czech Hydrometeorological Institute maintains four databases on air emissions by four types of 
polluters. The REZZO-1 database records emissions for large, stationary sources. The REZZO-2 
database records emissions for medium-sized, stationary sources. The REZZO-3 and REZZO-4 
databases record emissions for mobile and household sources, respectively. We use the REZZO-1 
database for our analysis, which, by its nature, should have the largest overlap with the financial and 
ownership data we possess. The REZZO-1 database records emissions at individual units of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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individual facilities. The Czech Hydrometeorological Institute aggregates the air emissions to the 
level of each facility before public release of the data. We further aggregate air emissions across all 
facilities associated with a single firm (i.e., we attribute the aggregated emissions to a single firm). 
Finally, we add the four pollutants into one composite measure of air emissions.
9 
In order to generate the largest sample possible and to avoid a sample selection bias due to 
attrition, we create an unbalanced panel of firm-year observations for the time period 1993 to 1998. 
First, we merge the data from the balance sheet and income statement files into a financial data set 
that covers the years 1993 to 1999 with 37,601 observations representing 10,102 firms.  Second, we 
add air emissions data that covers the period 1993 to 1998 with 9,703 observations.  The overlap 
between the financial data set and the air emissions data set is quite limited. The two data sets only 
hold 4,688 observations in common.
10  Third, we screen for meaningful financial data by applying 
the following criteria: positive production (measured in thousands of Czech Crowns), positive total 
assets, and non-negative fixed assets.
11  We also restrict our sample to those observations with non-
missing data for key financial and emission variables.  This screening and restriction generates an 
unbalanced panel of 2,628 observations, which covers the years 1993 to 1998.  We use this sample 
                                                 
9  Estimation of the individual pollutants generates results that are similar or less significant than 
those results chosen for interpretation. Tables A-1 of Appendix # 1reports the majority of these individual 
pollutant results. Complete results are available upon request. 
10 While unfortunate, this limited overlap does not indicate a problem with the data. Instead, it may 
simply indicate that firms included in the Aspekt database own medium rather than large stationary air 
emission sources or own facilities that lack the need to measure air emissions because such emissions are non-
existent or extremely low. In this way, the Aspekt database need not completely represent large stationary air 
polluters. Therefore, our results may not generalize to all or most large stationary air polluters. The opposite 
concern is not relevant. The REZZO-1 database is fully comprehensive of all large polluters. 
11 Other important financial measures, such as profits, are difficult to screen because they can 
truthfully take zero or negative values. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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initially to estimate the link from financial performance to environmental performance.  (As 
explained below, our econometric models use lagged rather than current profits as a regressor.  This 
restriction drops the sample size to 2173 observations representing 564 firms.) 
To estimate the effect of ownership structure, we add ownership information that covers the 
years 1993 to 1999 with 15,804 observations representing 5,811 firms.  A merger between the 
financial-emission data set and the ownership data set generates a combined unbalanced panel of 463 
firms with 1127 observations.  Obviously, we lack ownership data for many firm-year observations.  
(In particular, ownership information is less well recorded for the years 1993 to 1995.)  The data 
vendor Aspekt constructs the ownership data using four sources of information. First, the Prague 
Stock Exchange (PSE) maintains a Register of Shares for all listed companies. All stockholdings 
above 10 % for individual investors are made publicly available.
12 Second, companies provide 
ownership data via their annual reports and stockholder meeting reports as required by the relevant 
stock exchange and/or court of registry.  Third, the data vendor sends questionnaires to firms 
requesting ownership information.  Fourth, the data vendor draws upon published materials, e.g., 
newspaper articles.  While the first two information sources need not generate a selection bias, the 
latter two sources may do so.  We address this potential issue of sample selectivity by implementing 
a Heckman two-step sample selection procedure. 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents a statistical summary of the relevant firm characteristics. As shown in Table 
1.A, our data are sufficiently spread across the three years of our time frame. Table 1.C indicates the 
                                                 
12  Investment funds, portfolio investors, and the state (i.e., holdings by the National Property Fund 
and the Restitution Fund) often publish the composition of their portfolio, which makes information on 
smaller holdings publicly available. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
 
 
 
12
distribution of firms by industrial classification. Our data set contains very few observations on 
certain industries: agriculture and forestry, mining, and transport.  These industries, by the nature of 
their production processes, are not expected to be major stationary air polluters. 
Table 1.B presents a statistical summary of the remaining firm characteristics. First, it 
summarizes the key financial variables used in our study: profits, production value, fixed assets. As 
demonstrated by the standard deviation measures, our data set contains much variation in these 
financial measures, which will facilitate our estimation. Table 1.B also summarizes the measures of 
air emissions, which are measured in tons per year. As with the financial measures, our data set 
contains much variation for each pollutant and all pollutants combined, as measured by standard 
deviation values. 
Table 1.B also presents a summary of ownership structure. Our data set identifies the 
ownership shares held by certain types of investors: 
(1) state, 
(2) investment funds, 
(3) citizens, 
(4) portfolio companies, 
(5) bank (direct ownership), 
(6) strategic investors (other companies), 
(7) foreign investors, and 
(8) dispersed private investors (not included in the Table). 
Portfolio companies are similar to strategic investors in that another company invests in the 
identified company; however, the rationale for the investment ranges from hedging to improvement William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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in governance to asset stripping. The category of dispersed investors includes investors who hold 
less than 10% of a given company and never publicly announced their holdings.  (This category 
contains few holdings by investment funds, portfolio companies, and the state.)  Since these shares 
are not publicly available (unless announced by the relevant investors), we cannot measure the 
presence of this category directly.  Instead, we establish it as the omitted category in our regression 
analysis. As a benchmark, these investors clearly represent less interested, non-strategic investors 
since they hold such a small share of the particular company. (Given the reporting threshold of 10% 
for individual investors, it will be difficult to capture citizen ownership in our database of mostly 
larger firms.) 
As shown in Table 1.B., the state retains a sizeable presence in the average firm and strategic 
investors seem to dominate the average firm. To explore the hypotheses related to ownership effects, 
we use the state category as the benchmark for examining the effect of privatization. Moreover, we 
identify strategic and foreign investors as concentrated ownership forms and banks, investment 
funds, citizens, and dispersed investors as diffuse ownership forms (while acknowledging that 
citizens may differ from business entities in meaningful ways).
13 As a matter of fact, dispersed 
investors represent the most “diffuse” ownership type since each investor holds only a very small 
share of the firm. Although portfolio companies most likely represent concentrated ownership, given 
                                                 
13 Czech legislation prohibits investment funds from owning more than 20 % of any particular 
company. Nevertheless, some investment funds illegally agree to transfer decision rights amongst themselves 
or illegally coordinate their actions. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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the broad range of investment motives, the expected effect of portfolio investment is ambiguous. In 
addition to ownership shares, we create a variable to capture the concentration of ownership as 
measured by the stockholding share of the single largest shareholder (Ko_enda and Svejnar, 2002). 
Ownership structure varies substantially by industrial sector as mentioned in Section 3.1 and 
described in Table 1.D.  For example, the electricity, mining, and oil refining sectors are heavily 
state-influenced, while the rubber and plastic sector shows no state influence.  More important for 
the econometric analysis, within any given sector, certain investor categories are weakly represented 
if at all.  Once the econometric analysis controls for industry-specific effects (or firm-specific 
effects), it may be difficult to establish any statistical significance for the marginal effects of 
ownership structure. 
4. Econometric Analysis of Environmental Performance 
In this section, we use the described data to explore the link from financial to environmental 
performance and the effect of ownership structure on environmental performance at Czech firms. 
4.1. Estimate Effect of Financial Performance on Environmental Performance 
We estimate the relationship between environmental performance and key explanatory 
variables using standard unbalanced panel analysis. When examining the link from financial to 
environmental performance, we avoid using current financial performance, since contemporaneous 
financial and environmental performance are most likely jointly determined. Instead, we use lagged 
financial performance, which is considered as predetermined, e.g., Lízal and Svejnar (2002a,b). 
Thus, lagging financial performance avoids any endogeneity problem (Austin et al., 1999). 
Moreover, one would expect a lag between the generation of financial resources and the ability to William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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invest in ways of reducing air emissions.
14  This generation of internal financial resources is 
probably more important in a transition economy such as the Czech Republic. As a matter of fact, 
internal financing is especially important for investment in the Czech Republic since Czech 
accounting standards and tax laws require firms to finance all investment with retained profits (Lízal 
and Svejnar, 2002a,b). 
It is debatable whether estimation of corporate environmental performance should include or 
exclude the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. On the side of inclusion, the lagged dependent 
variable serves as a possible proxy for the type of treatment technology employed at specific 
facilities. It also captures the inertia most likely inherent in any production and treatment process 
(Magat and Viscusi, 1990); facilities most likely require several months, if not years, to modify their 
production and treatment systems. However, these long-run aspects should be completely (and more 
precisely) captured by firm-specific fixed effects, which represents one econometric approach for 
estimating the unbalanced panel data. 
On the side of exclusion, the lagged dependent variable is potentially correlated strongly with 
other important explanatory variables, in particular, lagged financial performance and current 
ownership structure, especially when ownership changes little from year to year. Once we accept the 
reasons for inclusion of the lagged variable, we should also acknowledge the existence of 
autocorrelated disturbances since the arguments are quite similar: installation of a given technology 
does not permit quick modification, which implies that the error term is likely to be autocorrelated. 
Most important, inclusion of the lagged dependent variable brings up non-trivial problems in 
the panel setup, especially when unobservable fixed effects are potentially correlated with the error 
                                                 
14 In Appendix # 2, we test the Granger causality between profits and emissions. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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term. For our analysis, we primarily use a fixed effect model to control for any individual differences 
across the firms in our analysis. Fixed effects estimation that includes the lagged dependent variable, 
when disturbances are autocorrelated, leads also to inconsistent estimates. While certain econometric 
methods, such as instrumental variables (IV) and general method of moments (GMM), address these 
issues, the existing methods rely on large sample properties (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982, Arellano 
and Bond, 1991). The small sample properties of these methods are still being examined (Bun and 
Kiviet, 1999, Harris and Matyas, 1996). Indeed, Bun and Kiviet (1999) show that use of IV methods 
can generate a severe bias in relatively small samples.
15 While inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable as a regressor would capture any potential dynamics in the evolution of environmental 
performance over time, any other benefits of inclusion are rather small compared to the enormous 
increase in complexity and potential bias associated with the noted econometric methods. Therefore, 
we choose not to include the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. 
We estimate environmental performance in two forms: (1) absolute emissions and (2) 
emissions relative to production (hereafter “relative emissions”). To generate relative emissions, we 
simply divide the absolute emissions level by the production level. Both forms plausibly capture 
corporate environmental performance. And both forms are relevant for the Czech legal framework. 
Czech government regulators impose both quantity-based limits (e.g., tons per month) and 
concentration-based limits (e.g., grams of pollutant per liter of air). Quantity-based limits relate 
directly to absolute emissions. Concentration-based limits relate roughly to relative emissions as  
                                                 
15 Our time span is only five periods at most. Inclusion of the lagged dependent variable reduces the 
time dimension by using at least one period for the lagged value and yet another one for instruments in the 
estimation (or lagged differences). The remaining three time periods are insufficient for IV methods of 
estimation. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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long as the level of production is proportional to the volume of air flowing out a facility’s 
smokestacks.
16 
Each form has its advantage. If one’s main concern is environmental protection, then 
absolute emissions is the proper form since environmental degradation depends on the mass of 
pollutants not its ratio to production. In contrast, relative emissions may better capture the 
environmental stewardship provided by a given firm. Arguably, a firm with high absolute emissions 
and high production might be more environmentally friendly than a firm with lower absolute 
emissions but very small production. In addition, use of relative emissions permits a more direct 
calculation of economies of scale between production level and pollution control. If economies of 
scale exist, then increases in the production level should lower relative emissions. In other words, the 
pollution control process becomes more efficient with increasing production. 
To construct the econometric models associated with these two forms of corporate 
environmental performance, we define the following notation. As the dependent variable, pit denotes 
the amount of pollution emitted by firm i in time period t. As the primary explanatory variable, πi,t-1 
denotes the profits generated by firm i in the preceding time period t-1 (i.e., lagged profits). We 
include other explanatory variables. Environmental performance most likely depends strongly on the 
level of production, which is denoted as yit. To capture the effect of firm size, we include fixed 
assets, which are denoted as ait. To control for variation over time with respect to economy-wide 
                                                 
16  We do not possess information on facility-specific limits. This omission should not be 
problematic. First, limits are frequently assigned for an entire sector. When including sector indicator 
variables as regressors, we control for limit variation across sectors. Second, when including firm-specific 
effects as regressors, we control for limit variation across firms. Third, by including year indicator variables 
as regressors, we control for limit variation in general across time. Fourth, the Czech air regulations do not 
explicitly include ownership structure or financial performance as factors for guiding the establishment of 
limits. Thus, limits are not expected to be correlated with our two key factors for explaining emissions. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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trends and the legal framework controlling air emissions, we also include individual year indicators 
(introduced later), collectively denoted as vector Tit. In certain specifications, we include industry 
indicator variables, which control for sector-specific variation; on average, firms in certain sectors 
may be more polluting than firms in other sectors. These industrial dummy variables are collectively 
denoted as vector Xit.
17,18 
Given this notation, the two basic econometric models are formulated as follows: 
Model 1:  pit =  α ait + γ yit + β πi,t-1 + eit ,  (1) 
Model 2:  (p/y)it = δ ait + η yit + θ πi,t-1+ uit ,  (2) 
where eit and uit denote the respective error terms. 
In each of these models, the error term is most likely heteroskedastic. To correct this 
problem, we assume that this heteroskedasticity depends solely on firm size: σit = σ ⋅  ait, where σit 
represents the standard error associated with the residual term eit or uit. To increase the efficiency of 
our estimation when correcting for heteroskedasticity, we multiply equations (1) and (2) by the 
inverse of fixed assets: 1/ait. The subsequent equations are denoted as Models 1A and 2A:
19 
 
                                                 
17  Each year indicator variable does not vary across the firms and each industrial dummy variable 
does not vary across time for the same firm. 
18  Surely other factors, such as fuel composition and treatment technologies, explain variation in air 
emissions. However, given our focus on air emissions aggregated across all facilities within a firm and 
summarized across the four major pollutants, these more specific factors are probably less important than 
corporate-level production levels and financial status. Moreover, incorporation of firm-specific effects will 
control for more particular factors like treatment technology as long as these factors do not develop 
differently over the sample period; note that year indicator variables capture any common trends. 
19  In Model 1A, emissions are expressed as kilograms per 1000 CZK of fixed assets.  In Model 2A, 
emissions are expressed as milligrams per 1000 CZK of fixed assets and 1000 CZK of production, i.e., 
[mg/(1000 CZK)
2]. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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Model 1A:  (p/a)it = α + γ (y/a)it + β (πi,t-1 /ait) + Ψ’Tit + εit ,  (3) 
Model 2A:  [(p/y)/a]it = δ + η (y/a)it + θ (πi,t-1 /ait) + κ’Tit + vit ,  (4) 
where εit and vit are the corrected error terms. This correction for heteroskedasticity proves quite 
helpful. The correction causes the Lagrange multiplier (LM) heteroskedasticity test statistic to fall 
dramatically from triple digits to single digits for each specification considered.
20 
To control properly for firm-specific effects, we estimate Models 1A and 2A using standard 
panel methods: pooled OLS, between group estimation, fixed effects method, and random effects 
method.
21 We use standard tests to assess these methods. When the F-test indicates significant 
individual effects, the fixed effects estimator dominates pooled OLS. Since this dominance always 
holds, we only report the pooled OLS estimates for the sake of comparison. We use the Hausman 
test of fixed effects to evaluate whether we could use more efficient random estimates or whether 
these estimates are inconsistent when compared to the fixed effects.  When the Hausman test signals 
that the random effects estimator is consistent with the fixed effects estimator, the random effects 
estimator is preferable since it is more efficient by construction. We report the between group 
estimator only to decompose and assess the random effects estimates. 
Table 2 presents the regression results for Models 1A and 2A. For both models, the F-test 
statistic for individual fixed effects indicates that the fixed effects estimator dominates the pooled 
                                                 
20  The specific test statistic values are available upon request.  As an example, in the pooled OLS 
specification, the heteroskedasticity test statistic value drops from 283 for Model 1 to 9 for Model 1A.  In 
general, the heteroskedasticity test still signals the presence of heteroskedasticity.  Thus, we always report the 
heteroskedastic-consistent (corrected) standard errors for our estimates. 
21  The between group estimator calculates the mean value of the dependent and independent 
variables for each firm and then estimates the model based on these mean values.  In the fixed effect 
estimator, the intercept terms are specific to each firm i: αi and δi. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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OLS estimator for both models, while the Hausman test statistic indicates that the random effects 
estimator dominates the fixed effects estimator in the case of absolute emissions (Model 1A), while 
the opposite holds in the case of relative emissions.  For both models, based on the random effects 
estimates, the effect of lagged financial performance is significantly negative, indicating that 
stronger financial performance leads to better future environmental performance (i.e., lower 
emissions).   For Model 2A, based on the fixed effects estimates, this effect is also significantly 
negative.  Therefore, financial success begets better environmental performance. 
By comparing the between group and fixed effect estimation results, we conclude that the 
effect of financial performance within a firm explains relatively more of the variation in 
environmental performance than does the effect of financial performance across firms. The financial 
performance coefficient based on between group estimation is strongly significant for both models, 
while the same coefficient based on fixed effects estimation is insignificant in Model 1A and only 
significant at the 5 % level in Model 2A. (For both the between group and fixed effects estimation 
results, the effect of lagged financial performance on current emissions is negative.)  
Production also significantly affects environmental performance. Higher production 
significantly increases absolute emissions, as expected, and relative emissions, which implies that 
the average firm faces diseconomies to scale between production and pollution control. 
These conclusions are robust to the inclusion of industrial indicators variables. 
Models 1A and 2A ignore the effects of ownership structure. The next sub-section 
incorporates these effects into our estimation of corporate environmental performance. 
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4.2. Explore Effects of Ownership Structure on Corporate Environmental Performance 
Next, we explore the effects of ownership structure on corporate environmental performance. 
To estimate the effects of ownership structure, we employ a synchronic approach, which controls for 
macroeconomic or sectoral conditions by examining various firms under similar circumstances. To 
implement this approach, we compare across firms, while including year and firm-specific fixed 
effects (or industry indicator variables).
22 
Before incorporating ownership effects into the estimation of corporate environmental 
performance, we must address the concern over the incomplete recording of ownership structure 
data. As noted above, the data vendor records ownership data for only a portion of the firms 
available in the financial database. While the decision to record ownership data most likely does not 
bias our results, we implement the standard Heckman two-step procedure to correct for any potential 
sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). As the first step, we use a Probit model to estimate the 
probability of ownership data being recording. As regressors in this model, we include the following 
current corporate financial characteristics: total assets, fixed assets, log of fixed assets, fixed assets 
squared, production, production squared, log of production, profit, and log of the absolute value of 
                                                 
22 Unfortunately, this approach potentially involves a selection bias caused by the state possibly 
privatizing only selected firms because they are “better” in some sense (Frydman et al., 1999, Gupta et al., 
2000). Most likely, this selection process depended on financial characteristics. Of course, environmental 
characteristics may have played a role too. If true, this selection upwardly biases the effect of privatization in 
that environmentally cleaner facilities were privatized.  In the Czech Republic, a substantial portion of 
investor’s concerns involving environmental matters focused on legal responsibility for remediating 
(“cleaning up”) on-site contamination caused by previous wastewater discharges and hazardous waste 
disposal (Earnhart, 2000c).  By 1993, these concerns were addressed by a Czech policy to relieve investors of 
practically all these legal responsibilities (Earnhart, 2000c).  Current, on-going air emissions were most likely 
less important. Even if current, on-going air emissions were important, investors most likely focused on 
absolute emissions not relative emissions. Thus, estimation of relative emissions most likely avoids the 
selection bias all together. Lastly, use of a fixed effects estimator should control for any non-random selection 
with respect to privatization (Frydman et al., 1999). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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profit times the sign of profit. In addition, we include industrial and year indicator variables.  This 
flexible form hopefully approximates any decisionmaking process that is based on the firm’s size, 
technology, and profitability.  The Probit model correctly predicts the recording of ownership data 
with a 83 % success rate.
23 Based on the coefficient estimates, we generate an inverse Mills ratio for 
each firm i in time period t, denoted as λit. By including this variable as a regressor in the estimation 
of corporate environmental performance, we control for any potential sample selection bias. 
                                                 
23 Complete estimation results are available upon request. 
To incorporate the effects of ownership structures into our estimation of environmental 
performance, we include various additional regressors. First, we include a regressor for each 
ownership type except “dispersed investors”. As noted above, we use this omitted category as the 
baseline for interpreting the effects of the remaining ownership types. Collectively, we denote these 
ownership variables as Wit. Second, we include a measure of concentration, as captured by the 
ownership share held by the single largest shareholder and denoted as Cit. Due to the incomplete 
recording of ownership structure, we must use a smaller sample size to estimate environmental 
performance once we incorporate these ownership-related regressors. 
To explore the effects of ownership structure on corporate environmental performance, we 
modify the models constructed above to generate the following expanded models: 
Model 1B:  (p/a)it = α + γ (y/a)it + β (πi,t-1 /ait) + Ψ Tit + ω Wit + µ λit + ρ Cit + εit ,       (5) 
Model 2B:  [(p/y)/a]it = δ + η (y/a)it + θ (πi,t-1 /ait) + κTit + σ Wit + τ λit + φ Cit + vit .    (6) William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
 
 
 
23
The estimation results from these two models are shown in Table 3.  Based on the F-test of 
individual fixed effects, the fixed effects estimator dominates the pooled OLS estimator. Based on 
the Hausman test of fixed effects, the fixed effects estimator dominates the random effects estimator 
for Model 1B and the random effects estimator dominates the fixed effects estimator for Model 2B. 
For both models, the results indicate that non-dispersed private investors do not affect 
environmental performance significantly differently than do dispersed investors.  In both models, 
none of the individual effects are statistically significant for the fixed effects estimator.  In Model 
2B, none of the individual effects are statistical significant for the random effects estimator.  (While 
two individual effects are statistically significant for the random effects estimator in Model 1B, the 
Hausman tests rejects the consistency of the random effect estimator in this model.)  Thus, this 
conclusion is robust across the various models and estimators. Moreover, as a collective, these 
coefficients do not significantly differ from zero.  (The log-likelihood ratio χ
2 test statistic equals 
8.97 and 2.31 for absolute emissions and relative emissions, respectively; given six degrees of 
freedom, these values are significant only at levels above 10%.)
24  In contrast to non-dispersed  
private investors, state ownership significantly lowers absolute emissions relative to dispersed 
investors based on the fixed effects estimation results.
25,26 
                                                 
24  For the relative emissions model, the log-likelihood ratio test statistic is based on the random 
effects estimation results.  Based on the fixed effects estimation results, the log-likelihood ratio test statistic 
equals 7.98; this value is again significant only at levels above 10%. 
25  To assess the influence of less than complete reporting of ownership data, we employ residual 
analysis.  In particular, we regress the implied residuals from the fixed effects estimation of Models 1A and 
2A on the RHS ownership structure of Models 1B and 2B.  The regression results indicate that the sample 
reduction due to incomplete recording of ownership structure data is not driving the report insignificance of 
the non-dispersed private ownership effects.  (Full regression results are available upon request.) 
26  In several ways, we assess the robustness of these findings of insignificant for the non-dispersed 
private investor effects.  First, we implement a more general logarithmic model.  In particular, we regress the 
log of emissions on the following factors: log of fixed assets, log of production, squared log of production, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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Appropriately, we next test the difference between the various non-dispersed private 
ownership categories and state ownership. Table 4.A displays the test results.  In one case, non-
dispersed private ownership reduces emissions more greatly; in all the other cases, state ownership 
reduces emissions more greatly.  Two differences are significant – (1) state vs. investment fund and 
(2) state vs. strategic investor – based on the absolute emissions results.  State ownership 
significantly lowers emissions more greatly than does investment fund or strategic investor 
ownership.  All other differences are insignificant.  As a collective, the effects of the various non- 
dispersed private ownership types do not differ significantly from the effect of state ownership, 
based on a joint test of equality, as shown in Table 4.A. 
Next, we compare across the non-dispersed private ownership categories, while contrasting 
concentrated and diffuse ownership structures. Table 4.B.I separately compares strategic investors to 
investment funds, individual citizens, portfolio companies, and banks.  Then Table 4.B.II separately 
compares foreign investors to investment funds, portfolio companies, individual citizens, strategic 
investors, and banks. In some cases, concentrated private ownership reduces emissions more greatly; 
in other cases, diffuse private ownership reduces emissions more greatly. Nevertheless, all of the 
differences are insignificant, regardless of the model. 
These results collectively indicate that the effects of private ownership do not differ across 
the various types of private ownership. In particular, based on the classification of private categories 
                                                                                                                                                             
product of log of assets and log of production, profit, year indicators, and ownership structure.  Second, we 
define a new category of financial institutions that consists of portfolio companies, investment funds, and 
banks.  Third, we fold domestic non-dispersed private investors into the benchmark category of ownership 
along with dispersed investors.  In other words, state ownership and foreign ownership remain as the only two 
ownership-type regressors.  The overall conclusions are robust to all three modifications.  Relative to 
dispersed ownership, non-dispersed private ownership does not significantly affect environmental 
performance, while state ownership significantly improves environmental performance. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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and based on the distinction involving share dispersion, the effect of more concentrated private 
ownership does not differ from the effect of diffuse or dispersed private ownership. Perhaps, private 
ownership in general does not matter.  In contrast, state ownership appears to matter. 
As noted above, the effects of non-dispersed private investors on environmental performance 
do not significantly differ from zero as a collective. Therefore, we can properly eliminate these 
regressors from the estimation. Presumably, this elimination of insignificant regressors improves our 
estimation of the remaining variables, especially state ownership and ownership concentration based 
on the single largest shareholder.  The resulting estimation results are shown in Table 5. Based on 
the F-test of fixed effects, the fixed effects estimator dominates the pooled OLS estimator. Based on 
the Hausman test of fixed effects, the random effects estimator dominates the fixed effects estimator. 
Thus, we should focus on the random effects estimation results. However, the Hausman test is close 
to the10 % critical value in the case of the absolute emissions model.  Moreover, in the preceding 
regressions, the fixed effects estimator always dominates the random effects estimator in the 
absolute emissions model.  Therefore, we also consider the fixed effects estimates of absolute 
emissions. 
The results support the following conclusions. First, the conclusions regarding the effects of 
financial performance and production are robust to the decrease in sample size. Lagged financial 
performance begets good current environmental performance. Greater production increases absolute 
emissions and firms face diseconomies of scale. Second, the significant coefficient associated with 
the inverse Mills ratio indicates that the Heckman two-step method is needed to correct a selection 
bias. Third, greater ownership concentration (as measured by the single largest shareholder) leads to 
better corporate environmental performance.  The negative coefficient is significant for the fixed 
effects estimation of absolute emissions and insignificant for the random effects estimation of both William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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models. This result contrasts with the results based on the classification of private categories and the 
distinction involving share dispersion. Perhaps the single largest shareholder provides a better 
measure of ownership control.  This immediate result supports the theoretical notion that monitoring 
of management is more important than managerial initiative. 
Lastly, we examine the effect of state ownership relative to all private ownership types.  The 
final conclusion depends on the treatment of sector-specific effects.  The fixed effect estimator 
controls for industry-specific effects by estimating firm-specific fixed effects. Since industrial 
classification does not vary over time for an individual firm, any industry-specific effects are 
subsumed into the firm-specific fixed effects.  Based on these fixed effects estimates, greater state 
ownership leads to better environmental behavior, as indicated by the significantly negative 
coefficient for both models in Table 5.  This result indicates that greater state ownership begets 
better cost management.  Alternatively, it reveals that the state expresses a greater concern for 
environmental stewardship by reducing emissions more strongly than private investors. Another 
plausible explanation is that the state privatized firms with relatively modern production and 
treatment technologies, retaining firms with relatively older technologies.  Once new and more 
stringent environmental laws were passed, the state had to modernize the technologies or risk being 
shut down. 
In contrast to the fixed effects estimator, the between estimator and the random effects 
estimator do not automatically control for industry-specific effects.  When industry indicators are not 
included as regressors, these two estimators generate results demonstrating that greater state 
ownership significantly undermines environmental performance, as shown in Table 5.  These results 
collectively indicate that the state owns firms in industries that are more polluting in general. To 
support this claim, we re-estimate the between group method and random effects method, while William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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controlling for industry-specific effects by incorporating 22 industry indicator variables. (As shown 
in Table 6, the industrial indicators are jointly significant in both models for the dominating random 
effects estimation.)  As expected, inclusion of these indicator variables causes the effect of state 
ownership to become insignificant and reverse sign, as shown in Table 6.  These additional results 
buttress the claim that state is generally involved in more polluting industries. 
These random effects and between group estimation results indicate that the type of 
ownership does not matter once the analysis controls for sector-specific effects, production levels, 
and financial performance. This alternative conclusion need not surprise us.  Production levels 
directly affect absolute emissions and indirectly relative emissions due to economies of scale (or 
diseconomies of scale) associated with the scale of production.  Sector-specific effects affect both 
absolute and relative emissions since the efficacy of treatment technologies and the malleability of 
production processes varies by sector. Our results support both of these points. Previous studies of 
ownership effects on financial performance find that certain ownership patterns generate better 
financial performance. Based on our study, successful financial performance begets good 
environmental performance, possibly by providing internal finances for investment in pollution 
reduction projects. The insignificant effects of ownership on environmental performance imply that 
ownership effects matter only for financial performance. In other words, the ownership effects are 
incorporated in financial performance. No further ownership effects remain to influence 
environmental performance. Instead, financial performance serves as the link from better ownership 
structures to better environmental performance. 
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5. Summary 
In sum, this paper examines the link from corporate financial performance to corporate 
environmental performance and explores the effects of ownership structure on environmental 
performance. Based on analysis of an unbalanced panel of Czech firms in the years 1993 to 1998, 
successful financial performance improves future environmental performance. Moreover, our 
analysis finds that increased state ownership actually improves environmental performance relative 
to all other investor types even though the state apparently retained ownership in more polluting 
industries. Indeed, during the Czech privatization of the early nineties, the state retained a significant 
portion of assets in the so-called “strategic” firms, which included many large state-owned 
enterprises in heavy industry.  Heavy industry generally emits above average pollution (World Bank, 
1992).  Nevertheless, after controlling for firm-specific fixed effects, which capture industry-specific 
effects, greater state ownership significantly leads to better environmental performance.  However, 
this conclusion depends on the treatment of firm-specific effects.  Random effects estimation results 
indicate that the effect of state ownership on environmental performance is insignificant. 
Beyond the effect of state ownership, estimation results in general indicate that no type of 
private ownership significantly affects environmental performance.  Individually and collectively, 
categories of private investors do not affect environmental performance differently than does the 
benchmark category of dispersed owners, who hold only a minor share of any single firm. 
Overall, the estimation results indicate that the type of owner does not affect environmental 
performance as long as the analysis controls for production levels, sector-specific effects, and 
financial performance. In particular, financial performance seems to serve as the link from better 
ownership structure to improved environmental performance. Put differently, ownership structure 
does not directly affect environmental performance; it only indirectly affects environmental William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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performance by influencing financial performance. 
In contrast, concentrated ownership, as measured by the single largest shareholder, improves 
the environmental performance, consistent with the notion that concentrated power allows an owner 
to manage better costs, including environmentally-related costs. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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  Figure 1 
 
Year SO2 
 
NOx CO PM  Production  of 
Electricity 
1980 2148 731 894 1267   53 
1985 2161 795 899 1015   58 
1990 1876 742 891 631   63 
1991 1776 725 1101 592   61 
1992 1538 698 1045 501   59 
1993 1419 574 967 441   59 
1994 1278 434 1026 355   59 
1995 1091 412 874 201   61 
1996 946 432 886 179   64 
1997 700 423 877 128   65 
1998 443 413 767 86   65 
1999 269 390 686 67   65 
2000 266 400 650 56   73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ročenka životního prostředí, various issues. 
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TABLE 1A.  YEAR DISTRIBUTION OF DATA FOR BASIC REGRESSIONS 
 
Year Freq.  Percent 
1993 353 13.43 
1994 467 17.77 
1995 468 17.81 
1996 484 18.42 
1997 457 17.39 
1998 399 15.18 
Total 2628  100 
 
     Notes:  
     For year 1999 we do not have data on emissions. 
     Year 1993 is used for lagged values. 
     Ownership data cover mostly the years 1996 to 1999. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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TABLE 1.B 
 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF FINANCIAL, OWNERSHIP, AND EMISSION VARIABLES 
 
 
Variable 
 
# of Obs 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Deviation 
 
Fixed Assets (000s CZK) 
 
2,628 
 
886,875
 
2,193,577
 
Profit (000s CZK) 
 
2,625 
 
-179
 
236,383
 
Production Value (000s CZK) 
 
2,628 
 
1,222,220
 
3,559,092
 
Emissions Total (tons) 
 
2,628 
 
963
 
4063
 
Emissions of Carbon Monoxide [CO] (tons) 
 
2,628 
 
127
 
1189
 
Emissions of Sulfur Dioxide [SO2] (tons) 
 
2,628 
 
515
 
2440
 
Emissions of Particulate Matter [PM] (tons) 
 
2,628 
 
121
 
621
 
Emissions of Nitrous Oxides [NOx] (tons) 
 
2,628 
 
200
 
849
 
State Ownership share (%) 
 
1,168 
 
6.14
 
16.65
 
Strategic Investor Ownership share (%) 
 
1,168 
 
27.77
 
30.41
 
Individual Citizens Ownership share (%) 
 
1,168 
 
5.72
 
16.88
 
Bank Ownership share (%) 
 
1,168 
 
0.99
 
5.70
 
Portfolio Company Ownership share (%) 
 
1,168 
 
2.17
 
9.02
 
Investment Funds Ownership share (%) 
 
1,168 
 
12.80
 
20.12
 
Foreign Ownership share (%) 
 
1,168 
 
7.61
 
20.64
 
Concentration: Single Largest Shareholder (%) 
 
1,168 
 
45.34
 
22.22
 
Note: CZK = Czech Crowns William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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TABLE 1.C.   DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION 
 
 
Industry 
 
Obs. 
 
Percent 
 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, Fisheries 
 
20 
 
0.76
 
Mining and Quarrying 
 
33 
 
1.26
 
Manufacturing of Food Products, Beverages, and Tobacco 
 
397 
 
15.11
 
Manufacturing of Textiles, Textile Products, Leather, and Leather Products 
 
216 
 
8.22
 
Manufacturing of Wood, Wood Products, Pulp, Paper, and Paper Products 
     and Publishing and Printing 
 
89 
 
3.39
 
Manufacturing of Coke and Refined Petroleum 
 
14 
 
0.53
 
Manufacturing of Chemicals, Chemical Products, and Synthetic Fibers 
 
126 
 
4.79
 
Manufacturing of Rubber and Plastic Products 
 
53 
 
2.02
 
Manufacturing of Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
 
234 
 
8.9
 
Manufacturing of Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 
 
308 
 
11.72
 
Manufacturing of Machinery and Equipment n.e.c. 
 
301 
 
11.45
 
Manufacturing of Electrical and Optical Equipment 
 
117 
 
4.45
 
Manufacturing of Transport Equipment 
 
193 
 
7.34
 
Manufacturing n.e.c. 
 
92 
 
3.5
 
Electricity, Gas, and Water Supply 
 
160 
 
6.09
 
Construction 
 
120 
 
4.57
 
Wholesale and Retail Trade and Repair of Motor Vehicles 
 
11 
 
0.42
 
Hotels and Restaurants 
 
16 
 
0.61
 
Transport, Postal Service, Storage, and Telecommunications 
 
6 
 
0.23
 
Finance, Real Estate, Rentals, Business, Research, Public Administration 
 
72 
 
2.74
 
Education, Health, and Veterinary Services 
 
22 
 
0.84
 
Other Public and Social Services 
 
11 
 
0.42
 
Other n.e.c 
 
17 
 
0.65
 
Total 
 
2628 
 
100William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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TABLE 1.D.   OWNERSHIP SHARES BY INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION 
 
 
 
 
Owner 
 
 Industry 
 
N 
 
State
 
Strategic
 
Citizen
 
Bank 
 
Portfolio 
 
Fund
 
Foreign
 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries 
 
10 
 
11.3
 
20.9
 
7.7
 
0.0
 
4.6 
 
12.1
 
0.0
 
Mining and Quarrying 
 
14 
 
27.5
 
13.3
 
0.8
 
0.0
 
10.0 
 
19.4
 
0.0
 
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 
 
185 
 
7.3
 
30.9
 
5.3
 
1.0
 
1.7 
 
7.3
 
10.4
 
Mfg. of Textiles and Leather 
 
93 
 
2.6
 
29.7
 
5.1
 
0.4
 
2.8 
 
19.4
 
1.0
 
Wood, Pulp, Paper, and Publishing 
 
40 
 
4.1
 
31.2
 
2.6
 
3.6
 
0.8 
 
24.3
 
6.7
 
Mfg. of Coke and Petroleum 
 
4 
 
53.2
 
0.0
 
0.0
 
3.5
 
0.0 
 
1.5
 
0.0
 
Mfg. of Chemicals 
 
50 
 
15.2
 
30.5
 
2.7
 
1.4
 
0.0 
 
11.9
 
3.4
 
Mfg. of Rubber and Plastic  
 
21 
 
0
 
24.1
 
4.9
 
0.5
 
9.9 
 
18.4
 
7.6
 
Mfg. of Non-Metallic Minerals 
 
89 
 
2.4
 
18.2
 
6.0
 
1.0
 
0.9 
 
10.8
 
23.4
 
Mfg. of Basic Metals 
 
155 
 
5.1
 
28.7
 
7.8
 
0.1
 
3.2 
 
10.4
 
8.6
 
Mfg. of Machinery n.e.c. 
 
154 
 
1.4
 
26.5
 
3.0
 
2.3
 
1.7 
 
19.6
 
4.8
 
Mfg. of Electrical and Optical 
 
48 
 
1.1
 
24.3
 
8.8
 
0.4
 
2.8 
 
15.1
 
5.2
 
Mfg. of Transport Equipment 
 
82 
 
2.7
 
34.3
 
8.9
 
0.5
 
0.7 
 
9.6
 
4.6
 
Mfg. n.e.c. 
 
35 
 
4
 
23.1
 
4.2
 
0.0
 
4.7 
 
11.3
 
4.2
 
Electricity, Gas, and Water Supply 
 
59 
 
25.8
 
22.2
 
0.0
 
1.1
 
1.9 
 
13.7
 
7.2
 
Construction 
 
56 
 
0.7
 
31.3
 
8.3
 
1.5
 
1.9 
 
9.0
 
14.1
 
Trade & Repair of Motor Vehicles 
 
4 
 
0
 
33.5
 
0.0
 
0.0
 
0.0 
 
10.0
 
8.9
 
Hotels and Restaurants 
 
9 
 
1.7
 
18.8
 
9.6
 
0.0
 
1.1 
 
28.6
 
0.0
 
Transport, Postal, Telecoms 
 
1 
 
100
 
0.0
 
0.0
 
0.0
 
0.0 
 
0.0
 
0.0
 
Finance, Business, Public Admin. 
 
35 
 
9.4
 
40.6
 
12.6
 
0.0
 
1.1 
 
3.9
 
0.0
 
Education, Health, and Veterinary 
 
12 
 
4.4
 
19.4
 
12.4
 
2.4
 
5.6 
 
13.3
 
0.0
 
Other Public and Social Services 
 
5 
 
12.4
 
8.6
 
19.5
 
0.0
 
0.0 
 
0.0
 
19.8
 
Other n.e.c 
 
7 
 
26.3
 
39.6
 
7.6
 
0.0
 
0.0 
 
5.9
 
0.0William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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TABLE 2.  ESTIMATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE: EFFECT OF FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
 
 
RHS Variable 
 
Model 1A:Absolute Emissions 
 
Model 2A:Relative Emissions 
 
 Pooled  OLS 
 
Production / Fixed Assets 
 
0.262 *** 
(0.057) 
 
1.426 *** 
(0.448) 
 
Lagged Profit / Fixed Assets 
 
- 0.266 
(0.533) 
 
- 13.261 
(10.381) 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.105 
 
0.056 
 
LM Heteroskedasticity Test 
 [significance level] 
 
9.24 *** 
[0.002] 
 
4.95 ** 
[0.027] 
 
 Between  Group 
 
Production / Fixed Assets 
 
0.300 *** 
(0.026) 
 
2.122 *** 
(0.379) 
 
Lagged Profit / Fixed Assets 
 
- 1.663 *** 
(0.491) 
 
-69.341*** 
(7.034) 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.205 
 
0.2 
 
LM Heteroskedasticity Test 
 [significance level] 
 
4.79 ** 
[0.028] 
 
272 *** 
[0.000] 
 
 Fixed  Effects 
 
Production / Fixed Assets 
 
0.336 *** 
(0.053) 
 
0.832 *** 
(0.299) 
 
Lagged Profit / Fixed Assets 
 
-0.391 
(0.306) 
 
- 3.199 ** 
(1.273) 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.72 
 
0.759 
 
LM Heteroskedasticity Test 
 [significance level] 
 
243 *** 
[0.000] 
 
0.798 
[0.372] 
 
 Random  Effects 
 
Production / Fixed Assets 
 
0.313 *** 
(0.019) 
 
1.193 *** 
(0.163) 
 
Lagged Profit / Fixed Assets 
 
- 0.506 *** 
(0.154) 
 
- 7.453 *** 
(1.274) 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
 0.105 
 
0.052 
 
LM Heteroskedasticity Test 
 [significance level] 
 
1.290 
[0.256] 
 
3.11 * 
[0.078] 
 
F-test of Individual Effects 
 [significance level] 
 
9.43 *** 
[0.000] 
 
12.78 *** 
[0.000] 
 
Hausman Fixed vs. Random 
 [significance level ] 
 
0.843 
[0.839] 
 
7.597 ** 
[0.022] 
 
No. of Firms /  No. of Observations 
 
564 / 2173 
 
564 / 2173 
Standard errors are noted inside parentheses; p-values are noted inside square brackets. 
*,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at  0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Each regression additionally includes an intercept term and year indicators. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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       TABLE 3.  ESTIMATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE: EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP 
 
 
Model 1B Absolute Emissions 
 
Model 2B Relative Emissions   
RHS Variable 
OLS  Between  Fixed Ef.  Random Ef.  OLS  Between  Fixed Ef.  Random Ef. 
 
Production / Assets 
 
0.2661*** 
(0.0412) 
 
0.3295*** 
(0.0187) 
 
0.4905***
(0.1545) 
 
0.2950*** 
(0.0168) 
 
1.5278 
(0.3507) 
 
2.0588*** 
(0.3454) 
 
0.9762** 
(0.3999) 
 
1.2752*** 
(0.1403) 
 
Lagged Profits / Assets 
 
-0.8288 
(0.6294) 
 
-1.4458***
(0.3367) 
 
-0.7064* 
(0.4236) 
 
-0.9214*** 
(0.1531) 
 
-17.9624 
(14.5202) 
 
-52.7879*** 
(6.2180) 
 
-3.3384** 
(1.6365) 
 
-4.3274*** 
(0.6791) 
State Ownership (%) 
0.0083* 
(0.0045) 
0.0128* 
(0.0061) 
-0.0079** 
(0.0037) 
0.0006 
(0.0037) 
-0.0316 
(0.0310) 
-0.0205 
(0.1132) 
-0.0138 
(0.0115) 
-0.0177 
(0.0177) 
Investment Fund Ownership (%) 
-0.0008 
(0.0024) 
0.0000 
(0.0053) 
-0.0001 
(0.0024) 
-0.0006 
(0.0029) 
-0.0267 
(0.0206) 
-0.0393 
(0.0983) 
-0.0025 
(0.0102) 
-0.0038 
(0.0132) 
Bank Ownership (%) 
-0.0047 
(0.0054) 
-0.0035 
(0.0154) 
-0.0057 
(0.0046) 
-0.0044 
(0.0064) 
-0.0420 
(0.0246) 
0.0567* 
(0.2836) 
-0.0221 
(0.0140) 
-0.0263 
(0.0273) 
Portfolio Company Ownership (%) 
0.0054 
(0.0069) 
0.0139 
(0.0095) 
-0.0059 
(0.0051) 
-0.0016 
(0.0048) 
0.0795 
(0.0933) 
0.2667 
(0.1758) 
-0.0055 
(0.0148) 
0.0020 
(0.0211) 
Citizen Ownership (%) 
-0.0108** 
(0.0047) 
-0.0060 
(0.0058) 
-0.0052 
(0.0039) 
-0.0095*** 
(0.0036) 
0.0299 
(0.0871) 
0.1635 
(0.1066) 
-0.0113 
(0.0135) 
-0.0017 
(0.0177) 
Strategic Investor Ownership (%) 
-0.0034 
(0.0031) 
-0.0024 
(0.0053) 
-0.0036 
(0.0040) 
-0.0046 
(0.0029) 
-0.0519 
(0.0229) 
-0.0958** 
(0.0986) 
-0.0003 
(0.0118) 
-0.0022 
(0.0132) 
Foreign Investor Ownership (%) 
-0.0058 
(0.0037) 
-0.0035 
(0.0061) 
-0.0041 
(0.0040) 
-0.0069* 
(0.0036) 
-0.0361 
(0.0178) 
-0.0082** 
(0.1118) 
-0.0017 
(0.0136) 
-0.0037 
(0.0172) 
Concentration: Largest Shareholder 
0.0046 
(0.0035) 
0.0051 
(0.0051) 
-0.0017 
(0.0036) 
0.0023 
(0.0029) 
0.0406 
(0.0361) 
0.1002 
(0.0943) 
-0.0021 
(0.0124) 
-0.0015 
(0.0137) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 
0.6042*** 
(0.1229) 
0.4582*** 
(0.1565) 
1.1599** 
(0.4633) 
0.6665*** 
(0.1364) 
6.9877*** 
(1.5024) 
4.7923*** 
(2.8903) 
8.3311** 
(4.1570) 
9.7183*** 
(1.1030) 
Adjusted R
2 0.304  0.52  0.785  0.295  0.139  0.226  0.973  0.092 
LM Heteroskedasticity Test 
    [significance level] 
10.58*** 
[0.001] 
0.557 
[0.456] 
73.63*** 
[0.000] 
3.30* 
[0.069] 
9.350*** 
[0.002] 
66.49*** 
[0.000] 
0.202 
[0.964] 
0.786 
[0.375] 
F-test of Individual Effects 
    [significance level] 
6.39*** 
[0.000] 
76.94*** 
[0.000] 
Hausman Fixed vs. Random 
    [significance level] 
17.85*** 
[0.003] 
2.270 
[0.893] 
Joint Test of Ownership Significance 
      X
2 (7) [significance level] 
8.966 
[0.255] 
2.311 
[0.940] 
No. of Firms / No. of Observations  463/1127  463/1127 
 
Standard errors are noted inside parentheses; p-values are noted inside square brackets.  *,**, *** indicate statistical significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, respectively. 
Each regression also includes an intercept term and year indicators. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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TABLE 4.  COMPARISON OF OWNERSHIP TYPES 
 
 
TABLE 4.A.  VARIOUS TYPES OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP VERSUS STATE OWNERSHIP 
 
 
Private Ownership Category 
 
Coefficient 
Difference 
 
Standard Error 
 
P-value 
 
Based on Absolute Emissions (Fixed Effect Estimates) 
 
Investment Funds 
 
0.0078
 
0.0031 
 
0.012
 
Individual Citizens 
 
0.0027
 
0.0028 
 
0.338
 
Portfolio Companies 
 
0.0019
 
0.0043 
 
0.659
 
Bank 
 
0.0022
 
0.0041 
 
0.600
 
Strategic Investors 
 
0.0042
 
0.0022 
 
0.059
 
Foreign Investors 
 
0.0037
 
0.0028 
 
0.187
 
Joint Test χ
2(6) 
 
8.317 
 
0.216
 
Based on Relative Emissions (Random Effect Estimates) 
 
Investment Funds 
 
0.0138
 
0.0166 
 
0.403
 
Individual Citizens 
 
0.0160
 
0.0192 
 
0.406
 
Portfolio Companies 
 
0.0197
 
0.0232 
 
0.397
 
Bank 
 
- 0.0087
 
0.0281 
 
0.785
 
Strategic Investors 
 
0.0155
 
0.0140 
 
0.268
 
Foreign Investors 
 
0.014
 
0.0179 
 
0.436
 
Joint Test χ
2(6) 
 
2.143 
 
0.906William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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TABLE 4.B.I.  DIFFUSE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP VS. STRATEGIC INVESTOR 
 
Diffuse Ownership Category 
 
Coefficient Difference 
 
Standard Error 
 
P-value 
 
Based on Absolute Emissions (Fixed Effect Estimates) 
 
Investment Funds 
 
0.0035
 
0.0033 
 
0.280
 
Individual Citizens 
 
- 0.0016
 
0.0025 
 
0.528
 
Portfolio Companies 
 
- 0.0023
 
0.0042 
 
0.589
 
Bank 
 
- 0.0021
 
0.0045 
 
0.647
 
Based on Relative Emissions (Random Effect Estimates) 
 
Investment Funds 
 
- 0.0016
 
0.0109 
 
0.883
 
Individual Citizens 
 
0.0005
 
0.0148 
 
0.972
 
Portfolio Companies 
 
0.0042
 
0.0188 
 
0.822
 
Bank 
 
- 0.0241
 
0.0254 
 
0.342William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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TABLE 4.B.II.  PRIVATE OWNERSHIP VS. FOREIGN INVESTOR 
 
 
Diffuse Ownership Category 
 
Coefficient Difference 
 
Standard Error 
 
P-value 
 
Based on Absolute Emissions (Fixed Effect Estimates) 
 
Investment Funds 
 
0.0040
 
0.0033 
 
0.225
 
Individual Citizens 
 
- 0.0010
 
0.0028 
 
0.703
 
Portfolio Companies 
 
- 0.0018
 
0.0045 
 
0.690
 
Strategic 
 
0.0005
 
0.0018 
 
0.781
 
Bank 
 
- 0.0015
 
0.0044 
 
0.724
 
Joint Test χ
2(5) 
 
3.199 
 
0.669
 
Based on Relative Emissions (Random Effect Estimates) 
 
Investment Funds 
 
- 0.0001
 
0.0154 
 
0.993
 
Individual Citizens 
 
0.002
 
0.0179 
 
0.911
 
Portfolio Companies 
 
0.0057
 
0.022 
 
0.759
 
Strategic 
 
0.0014
 
0.0118 
 
0.901
 
Bank 
 
- 0.0226
 
0.0267 
 
0.397
 
Joint Test χ
2(5) 
 
1.049 
 
0.959
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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TABLE 5.  ESTIMATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE: EFFECTS OF STATE OWNERSHIP AND OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
 
Model 1B Absolute Emissions  Model 2B Relative Emissions  RHS Variable 
OLS  Between  Fixed Ef.  Random Ef.  OLS  Between  Fixed Ef.  Random Ef. 
 
Production / Assets 
 
0.267 *** 
(0.042) 
 
0.330 *** 
(0.019) 
 
0.494 *** 
(0.154) 
 
0.295 *** 
(0.017) 
 
1.542 *** 
(0.332) 
 
1.989 *** 
(0.345) 
 
0.963 ** 
(0.395) 
 
1.275 *** 
(0.139) 
 
Lagged Profits / Assets 
 
- 0.874 
(0.617) 
 
- 1.482 ***
(0.334) 
 
- 0.701 * 
(0.425) 
 
- 0.925 *** 
(0.152) 
 
- 17.89 
(14.35) 
 
- 51.97 *** 
(6.22) 
 
- 3.33 ** 
(1.63) 
 
- 4.31 *** 
(0.675) 
 
State Ownership (%) 
 
0.0123 *** 
(0.0043) 
 
0.0154 ***
(0.0041) 
 
- 0.0048 ** 
(0.0020) 
 
0.0049 * 
(0..0027) 
 
0.0023 
(0.0272) 
 
0.0144 
(0.0761) 
 
- 0.0210 * 
(0.0062) 
 
- 0.0148 
(0.0137) 
 
Concentration: Largest Shareholder 
 
0.0016 
(0.0024) 
 
0.0028 
(0.0031) 
 
- 0.0045 * 
(0.0025) 
 
- 0.0015 
(0.0020) 
 
- 0.0024 
(0.0171) 
 
0.0201 
(0.0600) 
 
- 0.0013 
(0.0066) 
 
- 0.0025 
(0.0099) 
 
Inverse Mills Ratio 
 
0.552 *** 
(0.120) 
 
0.436 *** 
(0.149) 
 
1.108 ** 
(0.444) 
 
0.622 *** 
(0.134) 
 
7.53 *** 
(2.18) 
 
7.16 ** 
(2.77) 
 
8.25 ** 
(4.09) 
 
9.66 *** 
(1.09) 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.298 
 
0.504 
 
0.786 
 
0.291 
 
0.129 
 
0.214 
 
0.974 
 
0.096 
 
LM Heteroskedasticity Test 
    [significance level] 
 
10.81 *** 
[0.001] 
 
0.579 
[0.447] 
 
73.98 *** 
[0.000] 
 
3.322 * 
[0.068] 
 
5.62 ** 
[0.018] 
 
37.40 *** 
[0.000] 
 
0.002 
[0.964] 
 
0.766 
[0.382] 
 
F-test of Individual Effects 
    [significance level] 
 
6.52 *** 
[0.000] 
 
78.10 *** 
[0.000] 
 
Hausman Fixed vs. Random 
    [significance level] 
 
10.36 
[0.110] 
 
0.77 
[0.979] 
 
No. of Firms / No. of Observations 
 
463 / 1127 
 
463 / 1127 
 
Standard errors are noted inside parentheses; p-values are noted inside square brackets. 
*,**, and *** indicate statistical significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
Each regression also includes an intercept term and year indicators. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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TABLE 6. 
 
ESTIMATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE: EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL CATEGORIES 
 
   
Model 1B 
 Absolute Emissions 
 
Model 2B  
Relative Emissions 
 
RHS Variable   
Between 
 
Random 
Effects 
 
Between 
 
Random 
Effects 
 
Production / Assets 
 
0.345 *** 
(0.016) 
 
0.308 *** 
(0.015) 
 
1.942 *** 
(0.351) 
 
1.328 *** 
(0.140) 
 
Lagged Profits / Assets 
 
- 1.689 *** 
(0.297) 
 
- 1.016 *** 
(0.148) 
 
- 49.37 *** 
(6.49) 
 
- 4.49 *** 
(0.689) 
 
State Ownership (%) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0040) 
 
- 0.0018 
(0..0027) 
 
- 0.0158 
(0.0880) 
 
- 0.0145 
(0.0139) 
 
Concentration: Largest Shareholder 
 
0.0034 
(0.0028) 
 
- 0.0012 
(0.0019) 
 
0.0272 
(0.0615) 
 
- 0.0014 
(0.0101) 
 
Inverse Mills Ratio 
 
0.575 *** 
(0.196) 
 
0.731 *** 
(0.162) 
 
16.3 *** 
(4.29) 
 
11.98 *** 
(1.22) 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.642 
 
0.48 
 
0.217 
 
0.116 
 
LM Heteroskedasticity Test 
    [significance level] 
 
0.996 
[0.318] 
 
7.830 *** 
[0.005] 
 
55.69 *** 
[0.000] 
 
7.07 *** 
[0.008] 
 
F-test of Individual Effects 
    [significance level] 
 
4.19*** 
[0.000] 
 
71.57 *** 
[0.000] 
 
Test of Industrial Dummies in RE  χ
2(21)
    [significance level] 
 
81*** 
[0.000] 
 
231 *** 
[0.000] 
 
Hausman Fixed vs. Random 
    [significance level] 
 
10.18 
[0.117] 
 
1.70 
[0.888] 
 
No. of Firms / No. of Observations 
 
463 / 1127 
 
463 / 1127 
 
Standard errors are noted inside parentheses; p-values are noted inside square brackets. 
*,**, and *** indicate statistical significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
Each regression also includes an intercept term, year indicators, and 22 industrial indicators (for which the 
excluded category is the manufacturing of machinery n.e.c.) William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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  APPENDIX # 1 
 
Table A-1.  Estimation of Environmental Performance as Measured by Individual Air Pollutants 
   
 
 
 
Carbon Monoxide 
 
Sulphur Dioxide 
 
Particular Matter 
 
Nitrous Oxides 
 
RHS Variable 
 
Model 1A 
 
Model 2A 
 
Model 1A 
 
Model 2A 
 
Model 1A 
 
Model 2A 
 
Model 1A 
 
Model 2A 
 
Pooled OLS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Production / 
   Fixed Assets 
 
0.031*** 
(0.007) 
 
0.127*** 
(0.046) 
 
0.006 
(0.014) 
 
-0.039 
(0.063) 
 
0.028*** 
(0.006) 
 
0.165** 
(0.070) 
 
0.196*** 
(0.056) 
 
1.173*** 
(0.353) 
 
Lagged Profit / 
   Fixed Assets 
 
-0.016 
(0.036) 
 
-0.516* 
(0.263) 
 
-0.056 
(0.339) 
 
-3.757* 
(1.983) 
 
-0.221 
(0.196) 
 
-8.254 
(7.714) 
 
0.026 
(0.095) 
 
-0.735 
(0.935) 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.045 
 
0.021 
 
0.001 
 
0.011 
 
0.032 
 
0.029 
 
0.47 
 
0.393 
 
LM Heterosk. Test 
  [significance level] 
 
1.45 
[0.231] 
 
0.52 
[0.469] 
 
11.96*** 
[0.001] 
 
5.14** 
[0.023] 
 
0.84 
[0.358] 
 
53.2** 
[0.000] 
 
1450*** 
[0.000] 
 
228*** 
[0.000] 
 
Between Group 
 
Production / 
   Fixed Assets 
 
0.027*** 
(0.004) 
 
0.133*** 
(0.028) 
 
0.000 
(0.016) 
 
0.014    
(0.135) 
 
0.038*** 
(0.007) 
 
0.507** 
(0.244) 
 
0.235*** 
(0.008) 
 
1.467*** 
(0.054) 
 
Lagged Profit / 
   Fixed Assets 
 
-0.051 
(0.068) 
 
-1.794*** 
(0.528) 
 
-0.427 
(0.300) 
 
-14.86*** 
(2.514) 
 
-1.184*** 
(0.137) 
 
-48.86*** 
(4.538) 
 
-0.001 
(0.140) 
 
-3.826*** 
(0.993) 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.091 
 
0.064 
 
0.014 
 
0.097 
 
0.151 
 
0.206 
 
0.643 
 
0.586 
 
LM Heterosk. Test 
  [significance level] 
 
0.29 
[0.592] 
 
1.74 
[0.187] 
 
37.3*** 
[0.000] 
 
82.3*** 
[0.000] 
 
150*** 
[0.000] 
 
386*** 
[0.000] 
 
407*** 
[0.028] 
 
246*** 
[0.000] 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
Production / 
   Fixed Assets 
 
0.061*** 
(0.014) 
 
0.230*** 
(0.048) 
 
0.091*  
(0.050) 
 
-0.028 
(0.132) 
 
0.023 
(0.020) 
 
-0.018 
(0.054) 
 
0.160*** 
(0.033) 
 
0.648*** 
(0.241) 
 
Lagged Profit / 
   Fixed Assets 
 
0021 
(0.049) 
 
0.007 
(0.165) 
 
-0.216 
(0.197) 
 
-1.934** 
(0.853) 
 
-0.104 
(0.081) 
 
-0.673* 
(0.392) 
 
-0.093** 
(0.037) 
 
-0.599** 
(0.281) 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.28 
 
0.419 
 
0.712 
 
0.507 
 
0.422 
 
0.941 
 
0.909 
 
0.765 
 
LM Heterosk. Test 
  [significance level] 
 
553*** 
[0.000] 
 
162*** 
[0.000] 
 
749*** 
[0.000] 
 
25.1*** 
[0.000] 
 
492*** 
[0.000] 
 
0.031 
[0.861] 
 
154*** 
[0.000] 
 
4.98** 
[0.026] 
 
Random Effects 
 
Production / 
   Fixed Assets 
 
0.034*** 
(0.004) 
 
0.152*** 
(0.024) 
 
0.046*** 
(0.011) 
 
-0.038 
(0.082) 
 
0.029*** 
(0.006) 
 
-0.005 
(0.054) 
 
0.187*** 
(0.004) 
 
1.110*** 
(0.035) 
 
Lagged Profit / 
   Fixed Assets 
 
-0.015 
(0.041) 
 
-0.351 
(0.236) 
 
-0.271*** 
(0.092) 
 
-3.518*** 
(0.771) 
 
-0.243*** 
(0.059) 
 
-1.527*** 
(0.352) 
 
-0.057* 
(0.030) 
 
-0.441 
(0.302) 
 
Adjusted R
2 
 
 0.045 
 
0.02 
 
 0.005 
 
0.011 
 
 0.032 
 
0.014 
 
 0.469 
 
0.392 
 
LM Heterosk. Test 
 [significance level] 
 
1.186 
[0.276] 
 
0.101 
[0.750] 
 
4.95** 
[0.256] 
 
3.11* 
[0.078] 
 
0.928 
[0.335] 
 
39.6*** 
[0.000] 
 
1569*** 
[0.256] 
 
311*** 
[0.000] 
 
F-test of Indiv. Eff. 
 [significance level] 
 
2.35*** 
[0.000] 
 
3.54*** 
[0.000] 
 
10.4*** 
[0.000] 
 
4.86*** 
[0.000] 
 
3.59*** 
[0.000] 
 
60.10*** 
[0.000] 
 
19.5*** 
[0.000] 
 
7.12*** 
[0.000] 
 
Hausman FE vs. RE 
 [significance level ] 
 
4.58 
[0.101] 
 
3.65 
[0.162] 
 
4.53 
[0.339] 
 
0.001 
[0.926] 
 
7.01* 
[0.072] 
 
4.437** 
[0.035] 
 
3.867 
[0.276] 
 
3.94 
[0.140] 
 
# Firms / # Obs. 
 
564/2173 
 
564/2173 
 
564/2173 
 
564/2173 
 
564/2173 
 
564/2173 
 
564/2173 
 
564/2173 
 
Standard errors are noted inside parentheses; p-values are noted in square brackets. 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%respectively. 
Each regression also includes an intercept term and year indicator variables. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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  APPENDIX # 2 
  Granger Causality Tests 
In this appendix, we test the Granger causality between profits and emissions. Granger 
causality tests rely on the estimation of these two basic equations: 
  ε β α α t i   -   t i
k
1   =   i
i   -   t i
k
1   =   i
0 t   +        +     X Y   +     =   Y
2 1
∑ ∑    (A1) 
and 
  ν δ γ γ t i   -   t i
k
1   =   i
i   -   t i
k
1   =   i
0 t   +        +     X Y   +     =   X
4 3
∑ ∑    (A2) 
where X denotes profits, Y denotes emissions, the subscripts t and t-i denote the current and lagged 
values, and k1 = k2 = k3 = k4 ={1,2} (i.e., we use lags of one or two periods). 
We must address the fact that the presence of lagged values of the dependent variable on the 
right-hand side of equations (A1) and (A2) in a dynamic panel data framework can lead to 
inconsistent parameter estimates unless the time dimension of the panel is very large (Nerlove, 1967; 
Nickell, 1981; Keane and Runkle, 1992). Anderson and Hsiao (1981) propose using twice-lagged 
levels of the right-hand side variables as instruments. They also discuss the possibility of using 
lagged differences as estimates.  However, Kiviet (1995) establishes the superiority of using twice-
lagged levels over lagged differences.  Kiviet (1995) suggests an alternative approach that involves 
direct calculation of biases and correction of the least squares estimates. Simulation results in Judson 
and Owen (1999) show that Anderson-Hsiao estimators, while the least biased among the available 
alternatives, are considerably less efficient than the alternative proposed by Kiviet (1995).   
Unfortunately, the extension of Kiviet (1995)’s estimator to unbalanced panels, while conceptually William Davidson Institute Working Paper 492 
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possible, is computationally unfeasible.  Fortunately, simulation results in Judson and Owen (1999, 
p. 13) also show that the bias problems are almost entirely concentrated in the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variables, while biases in the coefficients of independent variables -- β and δ in 
equations (A1) and (A2) respectively -- are “relatively small and cannot be used to distinguish 
between estimators [including OLS]”.  In sum, we elect to ignore the bias corrections in the Granger-
causality tests for the following reasons.  First, we are not interested in point estimates of the noted 
coefficients.  Second, any correction for biases would result in a significant loss of efficiency that 
would damage our ability to assess the causal relationships.  Third, the coefficient bias is most likely 
small.  Fourth, the dynamic panel nature of the data greatly complicates the bias correction. 
Depending on the specification of the time lag, we find that emissions never Granger-cause 
profits.  The p-values of these tests are much higher than the conventional 10% level. On the other 
hand, profits Granger-cause emissions. The p-values of these tests oscillate around the 10% critical 
level. Therefore, given the mentioned bias in the coefficients, we argue that no causality link exists 
from emissions to profits yet the opposite link appears to exist. 
Using a similar approach, we test the Granger causality between production and emissions.  
The results reveal that emissions never Granger-cause production yet production appears to Granger-
cause emissions, i.e, a link from production to emissions cannot be safely rejected. 
Full econometric results for all of these Granger causality tests are available upon request.  
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